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Abstract:

The Potential Effects of the Trans-Atlantic Common Aviation Area on Shannon Airport,
Ireland

The Trans-Atlantic Common Aviation Area is a proposed liberalization of the air
services agreements known as bilateral agreements between the United States of America
and the member states of the European Union. The new agreement would replace the
restrictive bilateral and Open Skies bilateral agreements between the United States and
the EU with a single comprehensive agreement. The emergence of true open skies
between the US and EU creates many economic opportunities and some economic
threats. One such threat is the situation faced by Shannon Airport, Ireland. Under the
current US/Ireland bilateral, Shannon's existence is protected by requiring US carriers to
serve Shannon with the same frequency they serve Dublin International Airport. Under
TCAA rules, air carriers will be able to serve any destination at any frequency they desire
(with the exception of airports such as London Heathrow, where limited slots are
allocated). Ireland as a whole will benefit from the opening of the TCAA, as it is
expected to increase tourism to the country, bringing in an additional 160,000 tourists
annually. Regionally, the west of Ireland will see an economic downturn caused by the
opening of the TCAA. The economy of the west is pegged to the success of Shannon
Airport and the industries which Shannon supports. The TCAA will have the impact of a
dramatic reduction of air services to Shannon, a reduction of direct foreign investment in
the west, a loss of jobs in the region, and a reduction in tourism as access to the region is
reduced. US carriers are almost certain to relocate all operations from Shannon Airport to
Dublin Airport under the TCAA. In the EU countries with which the US has an Open
Skies agreement, greater than 95% of US airline traffic enters through a single city.
Further complicating the issue is the breakup of the Aer Rianta, the government owned
airport management group under which Shannon, Dublin, and Cork Airports were
managed. The 2004 State Airports Act separated the Irish components of the company
into three new, independent airport authorities, each individually responsible for their
financial well being. The Shannon and Cork Airport Authorities will start out debt free,
while the Dublin Airport Authority will assume the total debt of the former Aer Rianta
group. Research indicated that while the Aer Rianta group was profitable in 2003,
Shannon Airport would have posted significant losses if it had been listed separately from
the Aer Rianta group. Under the TCAA, Shannon could lose up to €16 million or more a
year. A history lesson can be taken from the situation faced by Glasgow Prestwick
International Airport, the former sole international gateway to Scotland. As in Ireland,
heated debate occurred as to how Prestwick would be affected if international gateway

status was granted to Glasgow Abbotsinch Airport. To survive, Prestwick changed its
focus from passenger traffic to cargo, enticed a low cost carrier (Ryanair) to hub
operations there, and improved the ground infrastructure between the airport and the
nearest large city, Glasgow. If Shannon is to survive the post-implementation of the
TCAA, its caretakers need to take decisive action to give it a fighting chance in the "no
holds-barred" world of open skies.

The Potential Effects of the Trans-Atlantic Common Aviation Area on Shannon Airport, Ireland

1.0 An Introduction to the Paper:
This paper primarily examines how the establishment of the Transatlantic

Common Aviation Area (TCAA) will affect Shannon Airport, Ireland. The paper will
assume that the reader is uninitiated in the international political and legal background
surrounding the TCAA. Therefore, it will provide the reader with information essential to
understanding what is the proposed TCAA, historical events that set the precedent for the
TCAA, and the open skies and restrictive bilateral agreements the TCAA is meant to
replace.

This paper has (9) main sections.
•

Section One includes the Introduction and Thesis Statement

•

Section Two describes the prime historical events in the US and EU that
have made negotiations about the TCAA possible.

•

Section Three describes the TCAA itself

•

Section Four describes the open skies and restrictive bilateral agreements
currently in place

•

Section Five describes the potential effects of the TCAA on Shannon
Airport

•

Section Six explores possible solutions for Shannon

•

Section Seven draws final conclusions from the evidence reviewed

•

Section Eight is the appendices

•

Section Nine is the works cited

Sources and their Limitations

The author relied on many sources in the development of this paper. A complete
list of source materials is in the works cited section. The Internet was the primary method

of collecting information. Some of the primary sources include the European Union in
the United States Website, the Chambers of Commerce Ireland Website, and the 2002

Brattle Group Report. While every effort was made to use the most up-to-date, accurate,
reliable, and unbiased information, there may be some discrepancies in information
between sources. One challenge the author faced in collecting information was keeping

the paper accurate in terms of developments in negotiations. As the issue of the TCAA is
current and ongoing, some of the information contained herein may be dated by the time

of publication. The information in the paper is also limited to what is freely accessible to
the public. The author did not conduct any independent surveys, nor did he purchase
market research information from private companies.

Conclusions and their Limitations

All conclusions the author draws are solely from the information sources either
directly cited or researched. The author believes that his conclusions are the most likely
from the information presented. Actual outcomes may prove to be different. As a general
disclaimer, "It is often difficult to distinguish clearly which effects are caused directly by
aviation liberalization and which should be attributed to more wide-ranging economic,

technological or social change, which would have affected (Shannon Airport) anyway"
(Civil Aviation Authority [CAA], 2004, p.2)

Thesis Statement

The TCAA will have severe economic effects on Shannon Airport and the

surrounding economy. Under the TCAA, Shannon will maintain its status as an

international gateway in name only. Major US commercial traffic will relocate operations

to Dublin Airport. Shannon will survive; but will continue to function as a point of entry
for business aircraft and as a regional airport, driven by demand for tourism services in
the West of Ireland. If Shannon is to thrive in the future, it must begin to restructure its

current plan of operations.

2.0 Background to the TCAA

Negotiations between the US and the EU on the TCAA are now (as of May 2004) in
their fifth round. Liberalization of aviation on both sides of the Atlantic has led to the

belief by many Europeans and Americans that liberalization of the trans-Atlantic market
is the next great step forward for global aviation. Changes in the US and EU aviation

regulatory structure have made it possible for the current dialogue to occur between the
US and the EU. The two most significant historical events setting precedent for the

TCAA are the deregulation of the US domestic market and the passing of the "third
package" by the EU.

In 1978, the Civil Aviation Board deregulated the US airline industry, allowing any
carrier found to be fit, willing, and able to serve the US domestic market to do so. This

dramatic change opened the market up to new competition and made air travel available
and affordable for the common person. Annually, US consumers save approximately 20
billion dollars in reduced airline fares (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 17). Competition in

deregulation also led airlines to improve their operating efficiency. Since deregulation,
airlines have reduced their operating costs by 25% (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 17).
Deregulation also led to the development of the hub and spoke system used today by
airlines to maximize their number of destinations served and their load factors. Since

deregulation, average airline load factors have increased from less than 55 percent pre-

deregulation to approximately 60 post-deregulation (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 17). Overall,
deregulation of the US domestic market has been considered successful.

In Europe, the formation of the EU has led to new forms of cooperation on the

continent such as the development of a common currency, a multinational aviation
authority known as the European Aviation Safety Agency, and a liberalized air transport

market (Europa, 1999). The EU air transport market was liberalized in three stages
known as the first, second, and third packages (Europa, 2004, Feb 13). Introduced in
1993, the third package was the most influential (Europa, 2004, Feb 13). Its main

achievements were introducing cabotage between EU member states, establishing a
community air carrier's license, and freeing airlines, rather than governments, to establish

fares and rates within the EU (Europa, 2004, Feb 13). Since the third package, the
number of scheduled airlines operating in the European Economic Area has increased
from 77 in 1992 to 139 in 2000 (Europa, 2004, Feb 13). Many of these carriers are of the
"no-frills" low-cost variety. The increase in carriers has also improved service to many
secondary, underserved destinations. Since 1993, the number of air routes between EU

member states has increased by 30% (Europa, 2004, Feb 13). New competition on routes
has made competitive fares on special promotions more available than before. However
the average cost for "flexible" (meaning able to change date or time of departure)

business and economy class fares has been increasing since 1993 (Europa, 2004, Feb 13).
The third package has been relatively successful in making the EU air transport market
grow while benefiting the European consumer.

The TCAA is potentially the next step in this process of global aviation deregulation.

Combined, the US and EU air transport market would account for 60% of the world's
aviation traffic, making it the largest single market for aviation services in the world
(Done & Dombey, 2003).

3.0 What is the Transatlantic Common Aviation Area?

The TCAA currently does not exist in any physical or legal sense. Instead it

represents not what is, but what may be. The TCAA is a proposed agreement between
the United States and the EU that would liberalize trade in aviation services. It would

essentially eliminate barriers to competition and investment between US and EU carriers

(Brattle Group, 2002, p. 27). From an economic policy perspective, it would include a
series of liberalizing legal reforms regarding international trade and investment in

aviation services (European Union in the US, 2004, April 2). Expectations of what the
TCAA should be and should include are different for the parties involved. Even the
name of the proposed agreement has yet to be decided on, as some call it the
Transatlantic Common Aviation Area (TCAA), while others prefer to call it the Open
Aviation Area (OAA) (Larson, 2002). Regardless of what it is eventually called, the

TCAA is very likely to come into existence in some form or another. The Brattle Group
insists that four main points of interest will likely be discussed in any agreement that is
reached (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 27). The first point involves ownership of and

investment in airlines. The TCAA would remove restrictions on US ownership and
control of EU airlines and EU ownership and control of US airlines (Brattle Group, 2002,
p. 27). An initial step in this process may be to raise the legal foreign ownership

percentage above 50% (Kim & Lott, 2004). The second point involves right of
establishment (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 27). The TCAA would grant US investors the
right to establish airlines in Europe and EU investors the right to establish airlines in the
US (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 27). The third point deals with fifth freedom of the air rights,

seventh freedom of the air rights, stand alone cabotage, fill-up cabotage, and wet leasing
(Brattle Group, 2002, p. 28). The fifth freedom of the air is stated as "the freedom to
carry passengers and cargo between two foreign countries" (Hamilton, 2001, p. 17).
This freedom, already enjoyed by EU carriers within the European "domestic" market
under the third package, would be opened up to allow US carriers the same right. The

seventh freedom is defined as the freedom to "carry passengers from one state to a third
state without going through (the) home country" (Wells & Wensveen, 2004, p. 545). It
would also allow European carriers to continue on to the US from EU countries other

than their state of registration. Cabotage is "to carry passengers and cargo between two
points within the territory of a foreign nation" (Hamilton, 2001, p. 17). Stand alone
cabotage would allow US carriers to operate between two points solely within the borders
of an EU country or EU carriers to operate between two points solely within the US.
However, stand alone cabotage is highly unlikely to occur because the carrier would still
be subject to the laws and regulations of the domestic market within which it is operating.
It is far more likely in the TCAA that right of establishment will be exercised rather than

stand alone cabotage because of the legal complexities involved. Fill-up cabotage

involves carrying passengers between two points in the same foreign country while in the
course of providing an international service. For example, British Airways currently may
not "fill up" and carry passengers solely between New York and Chicago on its way to
Vancouver. Wet leasing involves the leasing of aircraft with crew from one carrier to
another (Hamilton, 2001, p. 190). Under FAA regulations, US airlines may wet lease out
aircraft and crew to European carriers, but they may not wet lease in European aircraft

and crew (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 21). Negotiations will determine what rights, if any, a
carrier may exercise in wet leasing an aircraft and crew of another country. The fourth

point deals with the government market for air services (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 28). The
TCAA would allow any US or EU carrier to provide services for any government of the
EU or for the US government (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 28). A point of contention for EU

carriers is the "Fly America" policy which states, "a department, agency, or
instrumentality of the United States Government shall take necessary steps to ensure that
the transportation of passengers and property by air is provided by an air carrier holding a
(US) certificate under section 41102 of this title (title 49)" (US House of Representatives,

2002). The Brattle Group explains this as, "commercial movement of military traffic in
international markets must be on a US airline if the itinerary begins or ends in the United

States" (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 96). EU carriers want an opportunity to cash in on
lucrative US government contracts to carry US government and US military traffic. A
fifth area mentioned specifically by the EU includes standards for aviation safety and

security, an area where the US and EU have had disagreements since the Sept 11 attacks
(Europa, 2004, Feb 13). In one instance, the US and EU reached an initial agreement on
the use of Passenger Name Records (PNR) of trans-Atlantic airlines. The agreement

protects passengers' private information while still allowing the US Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection to retain the records for up to 3 Vi years, instead of the 50 years
initially proposed by the US (European Union in the US, 2004, May 17).
The TCAA framework may also be defined by what the TCAA will not include

(Brattle Group, 2002, p. 29). The TCAA will not require the harmonization of FAA and
EASA regulation, nor will it involve the creation of a new agency to oversee air traffic
regulation (Brattle Group 2002, p. 29). Second, the TCAA will not require the creation

of a common anti-trust policy, as countries will continue to apply their respective anti
trust laws as necessary (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 29).

Both the EU and the US believe that the TCAA will bring to airlines the same
international commercial freedom that other, less regulated industries enjoy. The TCAA

would give airlines and investors the freedom to establish new airlines, restructure old
airlines, merge, and obtain financing as other industries do. From a purely economic
perspective, liberalization of industry usually results in increased competition and the

growth of the market as a whole. The same is expected of a liberalized US-EU market
for air services. As put by Rod Eddington, chief executive of British Airways, "If it were
left to the market, there can be little doubt that international airlines would follow in the

steps of other industries, and would seek the scale and scope that are currently denied
them" (Eddington, 2003).

4.0 Open Skies and Restrictive Bilateral Agreements
To understand why the TCAA has been proposed, it is necessary to understand
the system it is meant to replace. The current structure governing trans-Atlantic traffic is

a complex framework of bilateral agreements between the US Department of State and

the individual governments of European Union countries. Two general types of bilateral
agreements are in existence between the United States and individual European countries.
Open skies bilateral agreements are the most common. Open skies agreements "entail a
full exchange of the five basic freedoms of flight (plus acknowledgement of sixth

freedom services) as well as pricing, capacity freedom and unlimited designation of
airlines" (Dolan, 2002). Restrictive bilateral agreements are less common, but may
include fifth and sixth freedom restrictions, restrictions on capacity, and restrictions on
which airlines may serve which airports.

Open Skies Bilateral Agreements

The essence of open skies is a "market based approach to global aviation"
(Byerly, 2004). It is the belief that heavy handed government economic regulation of
aviation is not in the public's nor the industry's best interest. The US first expressed its

stance on open skies in the 1978 document entitled, "Policy for the Conduct of
International Air Transportation" (Toh, 1998). This document decreed, "America
(would) endeavor to 'trade competitive opportunities, rather than restrictions.. .and

pursue our interests in expanded air transportation and reduced prices...'" (Toh, 1998).
The first open skies agreement was signed in 1992 between the US government and the
Netherlands during the senior Bush administration (Byerly, 2004). The establishment of

Open skies agreements has met with bipartisan support as both the Clinton and thejunior
Bush administrations have continued support of the open skies policy (Byerly, 2004). The
United States' policy of pursing open skies bilateral agreements has resulted in 11 open

skies agreements with European countries and 60 total worldwide (EU Committee,
2002). Currently Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
Sweden, Portugal, Italy, and France have signed open skies agreements with the US (EU
Committee, 2002). However, the European Union has opposed these bilateral

agreements as it claims they are contrary to European Community law. In November of
2002, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled against Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the UK concerning their bilateral

agreements with the US (Europa, 2004, Feb 13). The European Community Treaty of
1957 governs the rights of establishmentin EU countries (EU Committee, 2002). The
ECJ maintained that because the bilateral agreements violated the "principle of non
discrimination" stated in the Treaty of 1957, they were in violation of EU law (Europa,

2004, Feb 13). The court argued that the bilateral agreements had two legal faults

(European Union in the US, 2003, June 5). First, they restrict access to the air transport

market through nationality clauses. Second, they contained commitments in areas that
are covered by European Community law, and thus are the jurisdiction of the European

Community, not the individual member states (European Union in the US, 2003, June 5).
The ECJ found that the bilateral agreements discriminated against other EU nations

through nationality clauses (Europa, 2004, Feb 13). Nationality clauses limit access to
routes to carriers who are "owned and controlled in majority by nationals of the

contracting states" (EU Committee, 2002). For example, in the Belgian agreement with
the United States:

"The clause on the ownership and control of airlines does, amongst other things, permit the United

States of America to withdraw, suspend or limit the operating licenses or technical authorizations of an
airline designated by the Kingdom of Belgium but of which a substantial part of the ownership and

effective control is not vested in that Member State or Belgian nationals" (Europa, 2004, Feb 13).

This statement could effectively prevent air carriers not substantially owned and

controlled by Belgian nationals from operating from Belgium to the United States. All of
the bilateral agreements contested by the ECJ contained similar statements. These
nationality restrictions place pressures on EU carriers not felt by US carriers. Routes

designated by the bilateral agreements can only be used by carriers owned and controlled
by nationals of the member state. Many European countries only operate one flag carrier,

which is state owned. The restriction on ownership also prevents foreign investment into
the airline and prevents mergers or acquisitions that would involve cross border deals. If

a carrier loses its status as nationally owned, it also risks losing its access to the routes
agreed upon in the bilateral. This has prevented some failing European carriers from
securing foreign investment or pursuing a form of restructuring such as merging with a
foreign airline (European Union in the US, 2003, June 5).
The ECJ also considered that these Member States have made commitments in

areas of "computerized reservation systems, intra-community fares and rates, and airport
slots"(Europa, 2004, Feb 13). These are all areas of competence that had been transferred
from the Member States to the European Union. In response to the decision of the court,

the European Community has placed an onus on the Member States in violation to bring
their agreements with the US in line with Community policy (Europa, 2004, Feb 13).
The ruling achieved two goals. First it cleared up the question of who has jurisdiction
over international aviation policy, individual member states or the European Community.

Second, it created a proposal for a mandate for the EU to start negotiations with the US

and with third parties regarding air transportation (Europa, 2004, Feb 13).
In June of 2003, the Transport Council of the European Commission passed a

mandate that transferred responsibility for air transport negotiations to the European

Commission (European Union in the US, 2003, June 5). The mandate was part of a three
part package. First, the mandate authorized the European Commission to open
negotiations with the United States concerning air transport. Second, the mandate
authorized the EC to open negotiations with third countries to replace existing bilateral

agreements with a Community agreement. Third, the mandate issued a proposal for a
"Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the negotiation and

implementation of air service agreements between member states and third countries"
(European Union in the US, 2003, June 5). The first part of the mandate will allow
representatives from the United States and the European Union to discuss opening up
their markets and ownership rules for the first time directly. They will be able to discuss
issues such as "traffic rights, routes, capacity, frequency, slots, fares, application of
competition rules, safety, and aviation security" (European Union in the US, 2003, June
5). The second part of the mandate allows the EC to open negotiations with any foreign
country to secure market access for all European Community airlines on a "non

discriminatory" basis (European Union in the US, 2003, June 5). This non-

discriminatory clause is specifically directed to prevent any new bilateral agreements
from being signed which discriminate on the basis of nationality. The third part of the
mandate sets the legal framework for a document that will outline the EC's rules and

procedures for negotiations and amendments. The mandate, while affecting the open

skies agreements currently in place, also affects the restrictive bilateral agreements
maintained by several European countries with the United States.

Restrictive US- EU Bilateral agreements

Four European countries maintain restrictive bilateral agreements with the United

States. These countries are Ireland, United Kingdom, Spain, and Greece. These bilateral

agreements remain in place to protect domestic interests while limiting or controlling
access of foreign carriers. There are several ways that countries protect their national
interests through bilateral agreements. Access to an airport may be restricted to a set

number of airlines operating a set number of daily flights. Access may be only granted to
a desirable airport if an airline chooses to serve a second, less desirable airport. Such are
the cases of London Heathrow, and Dublin/Shannon respectively.

The Bermuda II Agreement

The most visible example of a restrictive bilateral agreement is the Bermuda II
agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. The Bermuda II
agreement was signed in 1977 after the UK scrapped its previous agreement with the US

(United States General Accounting Office (USGAO), 1997, p.4). The Bermuda II

agreement limits competition between the US and the UK in three main ways. The focus

of the Bermuda II agreement is to control access to London Heathrow Airport (Tardy,
2003, June 6). First, it limits the amount of service airlines can provide between the US
and the UK. Second, it limits access to London Heathrow to American Airlines, United

Airlines, British Airways, and Virgin Atlantic. Third, it dictates American and United's
access to Heathrow from their respective primary hubs. American is not allowed to serve
Heathrow from Dallas/Fort Worth. United is allowed to serve Heathrow from Chicago

O'Hare, but only on a limited basis (USGAO, 1997, p 4). An agreement reached in 1997
limits United to two flights per day from Chicago O'Hare to Heathrow (USGAO, 1997,
6).

Because access to the market is limited, market share is dominated by a few key

players. American and British Airways account for the largest shares of the US-UK
market. As of 1996, these airlines combined accounted for 60% of the total scheduled

traffic between the US and the UK (USGAO, 1997, p. 7). Of the 55 total daily roundtrip

flights between the US and Heathrow, American operated 14 and British Airways

operated 24 of them. American Airlines and British Airways also provide 70% of the
service between London Heathrow and key US cities including New York, Boston,
«

Chicago, Miami, Seattle, and Philadelphia (USGAO, 1997, p. 8). Through Bermuda II,
the UK's access to the United States has grown, while the US's access to the UK has
remained limited.

In 1991, Bermuda II was revised to allow United and American to replace Pan

Am and TWA as the US carriers allowed to serve Heathrow (USGAO, 1997, p. 5). As

part of the agreement, British Airways was allowed to code share with a US airline,-ft
Ghose-te-eede-STrarc with a US airline. It chose to code share with US Air. The 1991

agreement also removed Virgin Atlantic's restriction from using Heathrow. As a result
of the changes, UK carriers have steadily increased their market share of the transAtlantic traffic between the US and the UK. Between 1992 and 1996, UK carriers' share

of the market increase from 49 to 59 percent (USGAO, 1997, p. 4). The gain came

largely at the expense of US carriers who were not allowed to serve Heathrow (USGAO,

1997, p. 4). Those other carriers are relegated to serving Gatwick Airport. The problem
with Gatwick is that it is not as attractive to business travelers as it is located farther from

downtown London. It also has fewer connecting flights to Europe, the Middle East, and

Africa (USGAO, 1997, p. 4). Carriers serving Gatwick include Delta, Northwest, and
Continental. Delta serves it from New York and Atlanta. Northwest flies from Detroit

and Minneapolis. Continental serves Gatwick from Newark and Houston. Potentially,
under an open skies agreement, these carriers could move part of their operations to
London Heathrow.

While some of the restrictions on access to Heathrow are political, many of the

restrictions are in place for physical reasons. First, as Heathrow is a very busy airport, it
allocates takeoff and landing slots to manage the flow of traffic into and out of the

airport. There are a limited number of these slots available to the airlines serving
Heathrow. To allow new carriers to access Heathrow, carriers currently serving

Heathrow would have to give up some of their slots (USGAO, 1997, p. 2). American

Airlines and British Airways both have insisted that if under open skies they are required

to relinquish some of their slots, they should be paid fair market value for them (USGAO,
1997, p. 2). Becausethe new carriers would be required to purchasethe slots, a new
barrier to entry would be created by the buying and selling of slots. In 1985, the US DOT

adopted a buy-sell approach for slots at Chicago O'Hare, JFK, LaGuardia, and
Washington National. A 1996 report on domestic competition found that competition

actually decreased at three of the four airports (USGAO, 1997, p. 14). Even if American
and United agree to sell some of their slots, the EU maintains that EU regulations prohibit

the buying and selling of slots. Some sort of agreement would have to be reached to
fairly compensate these airlines for the loss of major revenue generating slots at
Heathrow under an open skies regime. Second, the physical capacity of London

Heathrow for growth is limited. New competitors would need access to gates, ticket
counters, terminal space, and baggage facilities (USGAO, 1997, p. 3). Community and
environmental concerns delayed approval of London Heathrow's fifth terminal. The new
$3.19 billion USD terminal will not open in its first phase until 2007 and will not be fully
operational until 2015 (Airwise Airport Guide, 2003). The timeline of development on
the fifth terminal will limit access to Heathrow even if an open skies agreement is
reached before that time.

Relaxing bilateral restrictions between the US and the UK is of particular
significance to the US, and is one of the US's main goals in establishing the TCAA. The
US-UK transatlantic market is the largest US-European market. It carried approximately
12 million passengers in 1996, making it more than twice the size of the US-Germany
market and three times the size of the US-France market (USGAO, 1997, p. 4).
Additionally, the restrictions on the market greatly increase the cost to travelers from

Heathrow. Business travelers flying from Heathrow pay approximately 200% of the
price travelers pay from Amsterdam or Frankfurt (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 23). This

results in UK travelers paying €2 billion more per year for trans-Atlantic travel than
travelers from other European countries (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 23).

US/Ireland Air Services Bilateral Agreement
The bilateral agreement concerning air services between the United States and

Ireland was signed February 3, 1945 and took effect on February 15, 1945. (United
States Department of State (USDOS), 1945). It was negotiated as a result of the
International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago, 1944. The document is known as
the "Agreement Between the United States of America and Ireland Relating to Air
Transport Services" (USDOS, 1945). The document contains 11 Articles and an Annex.

It contains the basic three "R"s of an air services agreement; recognitions, routes, and
rights. Several important provisions are made in the articles, but the Annex contains the

most important information of the agreement. Article 1 refers to the traffic rights agreed
upon in the Annex (USDOS, 1945). Article 2 requires Ireland and the US to start serving
the routes they have agreed upon as soon as practical (USDOS, 1945). Article 3 prevents
discriminatory service fees against the foreign carriers at public airports and exempts air
carriers of customs fees on fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, and regular equipment that
they may bring into the country. Article 4 is recognition of the certification of aircraft and
airmen of both countries (USDOS, 1945). Article 5 requires air carriers to comply with
the air laws and regulation of the country they are entering or departing. It also requires
the air carrier to comply with the entry, customs, clearance, immigration, cargo, and

quarantine laws of the country they are entering or departing (USDOS, 1945). Article 6
should be noted, as it is the nationality clause.

It reads:

"Each contracting party reserves the right to withhold or revoke a certificate or permit to an airline of the
other party in any case where it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control are vested in
nationals of either party to this agreement, or in case of failure of an airline to comply with the laws of the

State over which it operates as described in Article 5 hereof, or to perform its obligations under this
agreement" (USDOS, 1945).

Interestingly, while the nationality clause gives a contracting state the power to
revoke the rights of an airline not owned or controlled by a majority of nationals, it does

not require the contracting state to do so. Therefore, it is possible for an airline that is not
controlled by nationals to apply to the rights in this agreement if the other contracting

state does not object. Article 7 recognizes that the agreement will be registered with
ICAO (USDOS, 1945). Article 8 recognizes operating rights granted previously between
the two countries (USDOS, 1945). Article 9 requires the contracting parties to give one

year's notice if they intend to terminate the agreement or any of the rights in the
agreement (USDOS, 1945). Article 10 recognizes that the air navigation agreements

signed in 1937 will remain in force until superseded by a new agreement (USDOS,
1945). Article 11 describes the process for amending the terms set forth in the annex

(USDOS 1945). The Annex is the most important part of the document, as it outlines the

traffic rights of the contracting states. Some refer to a stipulation in this section of the
document as the "Shannon Stop-Over" (Thompstone, 2003).
It reads:

"It is agreed that in view of the long transoceanic flight necessary on the above routes, and considering the
still limited development of aeronautical science, all eastbound aircraft on routes covered in this Annex
shall stop at Shannon Airport as first European port of call and all westbound aircraft on the same routes
shall stop at Shannon Airport." (USDOS, 1945).

It is important to understand the historical reasons for this stipulation. In 1945,
aviation was still developing, and commercial aircraft generally did not have the
capability to go beyond Shannon Airport after a trans-Atlantic flight, thus it was a

practical stipulation, not simply an economic one. Jet aircraft were just beginning to be
developed, and at the time, only for military use. This stipulation marked the importance
of Shannon Airport as an international airport of entry. The Annex was amended in 1947
to designate the points of entry to the United States by Irish air carriers. The Annex was
amended to allow Irish air carriers to enter the United States at Boston, New York, and

Chicago. In 1973, the agreement was amended to allow a single US air carrier to
continue beyond Shannon to Dublin (Aer Rianta, 2004, p. 2).

In 1990, the Agreement was given a major overhaul. The "Agreement amending
the agreement of February 3, 1945, as amended" was signed September 6, 1990. Two
major changes to the Agreement occurred. First, the Annex to the 1945 agreement was
deleted in its entirety (Office of the Minister for Foreign Affairs (OMFA), 1990). In its

place, a new Annex was written and attached to the Agreement. Second, sections were
added to Article 6. The new Annex included a significant change, the right of United
States air carriers to access Dublin. However, it was stipulated that "all scheduled flights
on this route, in either direction, shall serve Shannon" (OMFA, 1990). The amendments

to the Annex also granted United States air carriers to code share with an Irish or British

air carrier operating services between London and Dublin. This amendment stipulated
that the United States carrier may offer a flight number between a US gateway and
London through Dublin, but the total number of flights must not be greater than the total

number of US-Shannon flights in the same week. It also stipulated that the US carrier
must offer a minimum of four code-shared flights per week in each direction (OMFA,
1990). In respect to Irish air carriers, the Annex was amended to include Los Angeles as

an airport of entry. The new Annex also addressed air charter rights. In short, unless a
charter operator enters or leaves through Cork or Connaught Regional Airport, it must
make a required traffic stop at Shannon (OMFA 1990). The first section added to Article

6 gives designated airlines the "right to provide ground handling services for their own

operations" (OMFA 1990). The second section allows airlines, instead of governments,
to set the prices for air travel between the contracting states. It also sets limits on reasons
for state intervention concerning prices. The limits relate to protecting passengers and
airlines from discriminatory, predatory, or monopolistic practices and prices. It also sets
out a way for the states to resolve differences regarding prices (OMFA 1990). In 1993,

the Annex of the Agreement was further amended to allow direct flights by Irish and

United States air carriers to Dublin while requiring them to serve Shannon with equal
frequency (Aer Rianta, 2004, p. 2). This stipulation is the source of contention between

groups with vested interest in aviation in Ireland. Without it, they fear for the "very
existence" of Shannon (Tardy, 2003, June 5). They feel that the Shannon Gateway Policy
is a key factor in maintaining balanced regional development, direct foreign investment
(DFI), healthy tourism, and regular trans-Atlantic services (Shannon Development, 2003,
June 6 "Forthcoming"). Those opposed to it believe that it strangles growth in aviation in

Ireland. The direct impact of the cessitation of this stipulation under TCAA rules would
have the greatest impact on the future course of aviation in Ireland.

5.0 The Potential Effects of the TCAA on Shannon Airport

As the US and the EU continue negotiations on the opening of the TCAA, Ireland

remains particularly divided on the issue. Ireland currently maintains a bilateral
agreement with the United States. The terms of the agreement include Shannon Airport

service equal to the service provided to Dublin, the limitation to four US gateways for
Irish registered airlines, and restrictions on code share agreements (Failte, 2004). The
bilateral agreement is unique in that it protects Shannon Airport through its dual gateway

policy. For every non-stop flight a US registered airline makes to Dublin, it must fly a
non-stop flight to Shannon (Failte, 2004). Under the TCAA, US airlines could choose to
serve any city in Ireland at any frequency. EU "domestic" cabotage between Ireland and
mainland Europe would also be allowed. Further, the TCAA would open up airlines on
both sides of the Atlantic to foreign ownership.

Those in favor of the change see overall economic growth for Ireland. The
liberalization of trans-Atlantic trade is a top concern of the Chambers of Commerce

Ireland (2004, June 22). Supporters argue that the bilateral restricts growth that would
otherwise occur in a less regulated environment. Since the 1990's, the 11 countries that
have signed open skies bilateral agreements with the US have seen a 10 percent increase
in trans-Atlantic traffic (Brattle Group, 2002, p.7). Extrapolating that information, the

Brattle Group hypothesized that under the TCAA. traffic to the UK, Ireland, Spain, and
Greece could increase by 2.2 millions passengers a year (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 7).

Ireland itself would see an increase of approximately 161,000 passengers per year

(Brattle Group, 2002, p. 8). Supporting the opinion that the TCAA will prove to be a
successful change, growth occurred in the aviation sector when it was liberalized by the

EU. The UK experienced an increase in airline revenue as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP) from 1.2% of GDP prior to liberalization to 1.5% of GDP post
liberalization (CAA, 2004, p. 4). Increase in the number of passengers carried could also
fuel airline expansion and competition in Ireland. Past experience with the liberalization
of the EU market has proven positive for Ireland's air carriers. Liberalization of the EU

market removed restrictions on intra-EU activity, granted airlines freedom to choose
which routes they served and at what frequency, and removed many barriers to entry and

competition (CAA, 2004, p. 5). These market conditions are the fertilizers of low cost
carrier start up (CAA, 2004, p. 5). One direct impact the liberalized environment has had

is the growth of the low cost Irish airline Ryanair. Ryanair, though registered as an Irish
airline, conducts much of its business in the UK. Ryanair has successfully competed with
established European carriers on existing routes and has created new markets to
destinations that were previously not served and or were underserved (CAA, 2004, p. 13).
Ryanair's birth increased employment in the aviation industry, adding approximately
2000 jobs at Dublin and Standsted (CAA, 2004, p. 13). While some carriers could reduce
employment in an effort to cut costs to compete within the TCAA, employment across
the industry in Ireland should grow. Airlines and other interested parties in Ireland see
not a just a bigger share of the market, but a bigger market in sum.
Other parties see their share of the market acutely threatened by the TCAA
proposal, despite the potential for net growth. Economic and social development in

Ireland has traditionally focused on Dublin, in the east of Ireland. Further regional
imbalance between the west and east could result as international traffic to Dublin

Airport grows. There is just concern about the viability of Shannon Airport under the
TCAA. Currently, Shannon accounts for 44% market share of the transatlantic traffic to

and from Ireland, making it Ireland's second most important airport and the most
important airport in the west of Ireland (Failte 2004). Unfortunately for Shannon, it will
be unable to maintain this market share under the TCAA. While Shannon will maintain

its status as an international gateway, most major US commercial traffic will relocate
operations to Dublin. Shannon will survive, but will continue to function mainly as a

regional airport, supporting business aircraft and some commercial traffic driven by
demand for tourism services in the west of Ireland.

Why does Shannon hold such great regional importance to the west of Ireland?
Shannon is the economic flagship of the region. The local economy is tied to the health
and success of the airport. Its presence has a distinct impact on local jobs, direct foreign

investment, tourism, and air services. Shannon is the counterweight to Dublin's booming
development. A change in the status quo regarding Shannon's dual gateway status will

result in a loss of jobs in the region, a reduction in foreign investment, a reduction in
services to tourists and travelers to and from the region, and an increase in regional
imbalance between the east and west of Ireland.

Why will Shannon Lose Traffic to Dublin under the TCAA?

Shannon International Airport will lose traffic to Dublin not because people do
not want to travel there, but because the airlines won't serve it. A free, "open" market

does not dictate where services will be provided. In the case of Ireland, travelers currently
have a choice between flying into Shannon or Dublin Airport. Presented with that

choice, 44% of travelers choose to fly into Shannon while 56% choose to fly to Dublin
(Thompstone, 2003). Open skies will give the airlines the option to serve the cities they
choose, at the frequency they desire. An example of the schedule of airlines currently

serving Shannon is found in Appendix A. Determining the fate of Shannon, the airlines
will downplay the demands of consumers. For the airlines, the decision equates to a
simple economy of scale. If an airline concentrates its services at one airport in a small
country such as Ireland, it will save money. As such operational requirements drive
airlines' decision on where to locate core staff, consolidation in a single city makes the

most sense. By basing the majority of staff in a single city the airline develops an

operational "center of gravity" (CAA, 2004, p.10). Of the countries that have open skies
agreements with the US, the majority of US traffic is concentrated in the capital city.
Traffic By City in Countries with open skies agreements
with the US

Source: Thompstone 2003, from Official Airline Guide 2003.

Country

Main City Served

Austria

Vienna

% Share City Recieves
100%

Belgium

Brussels

100%

Denmark

Copenhagen

100%

Finland

Helsinki

100%

France

Paris

98%

Germany
Italy
Luxemburg

Frankfurt

96%

Rome

90%

Luxembourg

100%

Netherlands

Amsterdam

100%

Norway
Portugal

Oslo

100%

Lisbon

100%

Sweden

Stockholm

100%

Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden,
Portugal, Italy, and France have all signed open skies agreements with the US. Ireland,
UK, Spain, and Greece do not have open skies agreements with the US. It can be

inferred that demand for travel to other secondary cities in these countries exits, but is
A

ignored by the airlines because of the cost involved in maintaining more than one base of

operations. In open skies, the market determines airline destinations, services, and prices

(United States of America Department of Transportation (USDOT), 2004). Size of the

population of Ireland is another compelling reason for not retaining services at Shannon.

Even Germany, with a population nearly 21 times the size of Ireland, realizes greater than
90% of its international traffic entering through a single city (See figure below).

Source: Central Intelligence Agency , 2004.

X's the size
of Ireland's

Country
Germany
France
UK

Italy

Spain
Netherlands
Greece

Portugal
Belgium
Sweden
Austria

Denmark
Finland

Norway
Ireland

Luxemburg

pop (www.odci.gov)

82,424,609
60,424,213
60,270,708
58,057,477
40,280,780
16,318,199
10,647,529
10,524,145
10,348,276
8,986,400
8,174,762
5,413,392
5,214,512
4,574,560
3,969,558
462,690

Population
20.76
15.22
15.18

14.63
10.15
4.11

2.68
2.65
2.61
2.26
2.06
1.36
1.31
1.15
1.00
0.12

Most if not all US international carriers will move services to Dublin exclusively

(Shannon Development, 2003, June 6, "Consultation"). Dublin is the cultural, industrial,

and political center of the country and will support the largest traffic base. In a best case
scenario, Shannon will retain one daily round trip nonstop flight to North America, most

likely provided by Aer Lingus (Shannon Development, 2003, June 6, "Consultation").
The opening of the TCAA will not result in more choices for passengers traveling to and
from Shannon (SIGNAL, 2004).

Those who oppose the TCAA also point to the increasing airside and landside

congestion at Dublin. Dublin has experienced rapid growth in traffic over the last
decade. From 2002 to 2003, passenger numbers increased 5% to 15.1 million per year

(Dublin Airport Authority, 2004). Passengernumbers at Dublin are expected to continue

to increase by approximately one million passengers per year (Dublin Airport Authority,
2004).

Impact on Jobs, Tourism, DFI, AerRianta, IALPA, andAerLingus
Jobs

Many groups concerned about the Shannon region's future have attempted to
estimate the number of jobs that will be impacted if the Shannon airport loses its status as

a dual gateway airport. An economic impact study conducted in 1997 by Alistair Tucker
found that 2,500 jobs are created directly by Shannon airport, 5,000 jobs are created in

tourism to supporttourists enteringIreland through Shannon, and another 29,000jobs are

directly and indirectly supported by firms using the air services at Shannon (AerRianta,
2004, p.6). The 2,500 jobs directly created by the airport generated 35 million Irish

pounds a year for the region (Aer Rianta, 2004, p. 6). Other groups such as the Irish
Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) believe that Shannon holds even greater economic

weight than the Alistair study indicates. The ICTU estimates that nearly 100,000 jobs in
commercial aviation and tourism depend directly and indirectlyAShannon (ICTU, 2004).
Among those jobs that would be affected by a change at Shannon would be passenger

and cargo handlers, refuelers, car hire (rental) providers, financial service providers, hotel
and hostel employees, golf course employees, and many others (Aer Rianta, 2004, p. 6).
Aer Rianta, the Irish State owned airport management company, indicated that it will not
be able to maintain the current terms and conditions for workers at Shannon if the dual

gateway policy changes (Services Industries Professional Trade Union (SIPTU), 2004).
An additional 7,500 jobs depend on the continued existence of the Shannon Free Zone,
located next to Shannon International Airport (Shannon Development, 2004).

Conversely, the Dublin Area and Ireland considered as a whole seeks to gain jobs
under the TCAA. Currently, the 15.1 million passengers traveling to Dublin Airport in

Fingal County support approximately 14,500 jobs associated with the airport (Fingal,
2004). These jobs created €300 million in income for the Dublin region (Fingal, 2004).
The Dublin airport plays a huge economic role in the country. The top 100 companies
surrounding Dublin airport engaged in airport-related economic activity account for 2.1%
of the Gross National Product of Ireland (Fingal, 2004). Under the TCAA, traffic at
Dublin could blossom to 30 million passengers a year by 2015 (Fingal 2004). A doubling
in traffic leads one to believe that new jobs will be created to handle the demand. Thus,

those tied to the Dublin region support the TCAA as it will likely create many more jobs
and economic growth in the region.

Tourism

Ireland is the second largest destination for US travelers going abroad (Irish
Hotels Federation (IHF), 2004). On average, Ireland receives between 400,000 and 1

million US visitors annually. These US visitors generate an estimated €637.6 million per
year. The Brattle Group estimates that the opening of the TCAA will increase
transatlantic traffic by between 9 and 24 percent (Brattle Group, 2002, p. 72). The Irish
Hotels Federation assumes a conservative estimate of 10% growth. Assuming 10%

growth under the TCAA, Ireland could expect to welcome an additional 79,000 tourists
annually, generating an additional €63.7 million for the country (IHF, 2004). US tourists
are considered particularly desirable to Ireland because their average expenditure per
person is much higher than that of visitors from other countries. The average US tourist
party spends €840 per person on a vacation to Ireland. US tourists tend to travel
extensively and prefer to stay in more expensive hotels, avoiding the cheaper hostels
(IHF, 2004). North American tourists purchased 18% of the total Irish hotel bednights in
2000 (IHF, 2004). Regional dispersion of demand for hotel bednights by these North
American tourists varied greatly however. While the Dublin area supplied 20% of its

total hotel bednights to North American tourists, the Shannon region supplied 43% of its
hotel bednights to North American tourists (IHF, 2004). A negative change in the
number of tourists arriving in the region will have a strong effect on the financial stability
of the hotels in the west of Ireland.

The distribution of tourists throughout Ireland is also an important issue when
considering the TCAA. The national distribution of tourists has shifted slightly in

Dublin's favor since 1995. Following 1995, tourism in the Shannon and Cork-Kerry
regions has countered Dublin's increase with a nearly equal decrease in tourism (IHF,
2004). If the TCAA is approved, it is not likely that the 10% increase in tourism will be
distributed equally between the east and west. While the IHF believes that the current
distribution of US tourists will be maintained, most tourists will have to go out of their
way to visit the Shannon region. Even now, the majority of access to the west of Ireland
is through Dublin. Less than 15% of tourists to the west are able to access Ireland

through the west coast (Ennis, 2004). Still, the Shannon airport itself is heavily
dependent on tourist traffic. Approximately 32% of Shannon's terminal traffic in 2002
was on international routes (Shannon Development, 2003, June 6, "Consultation"). If the
TCAA is approved, tourism in the west of Ireland will see a swift, dramatic decrease as

access to the region is further reduced.

Direct Foreign Investment

The United States and Europe are each other's most important source of direct
foreign investment. In 2002, European companies invested €889 billion in direct foreign
investment into United States and US companies invested €650 billion in direct foreign
investment into Europe (Europa, 2003, June 25, "US-EU"). Exports of goods in 2003

from the EU to the US totaled €220 billion, 22.6% of all EU exports. In services, exports
from the EU to the US totaled €115 billion in 2003 (2003, June 25, "US-EU"). Ireland

has played an important role in attracting direct foreign investment from US firms.

Likewise, Shannon Airport has played a key role in attracting direct foreign investment to
the west of Ireland.

Shannon provides the logistical backbone for the corporations located in the
Shannon Airport region. Shannon Airport has been the catalyst for industrial
development in a region that once primarily depended on agriculture (Shannon

Development, 2003, June 6, "Consultation"). Because of the impact Shannon has had on
industrial development, the Ennis Chamber of Commerce has campaigned aggressively

to the Irish government to maintain the dual gateway status of Shannon. Foreign
investment into the west of Ireland is significant and vital to its economy.
The Shannon Free Zone was established in 1958 to attract more direct foreign

investment into the region (Shannon Development, 2004). It is a 2.43 square kilometer
industrial park located next to the Shannon Airport (See Appendix E). It was created to

drive a "virtuous cycle" of investment and growth in the west of Ireland (Shannon
Development, 2003, June 6, "Consultation"). Thus far a successful concept, the "virtuous

cycle" is that of air services driving economic investment, which in turn creates a demand
for more air services. 120 multinational companies conduct business at the Shannon Free
Zone (Shannon Development, 2004). This special economic area has attracted the largest
concentration of North American investment in the country (Shannon Development
2004). The Shannon Free Zone has been so successful, that by 2004, the goods exported
from it valued over €2.5 billion (Shannon Development, 2004).

Part of the reason so many North American companies have invested into the
Shannon Free Zone is the relatively favorable legislation governing the zone. It is

regulated by Section 39A of Ireland's 1980 Finance Act (Park, 1998). The companies

who qualified for the 10% (now 12.5%) corporate tax rate are "trading operations which
contribute to the use and development of the airport and which are undertaken with

qualified persons, not ordinarily resident in the State" (Park, 1998). The intentionally
broad wording of the legislation allows the Shannon Free Zone to accept companies
engaged in international logistics, product distribution, multilingual customer support,

manufacturing and assembly, technical support, and product customization (Park, 1998).

Tax incentives for companies in the Shannon Free Zone go beyond the 12.5% corporate
tax, which is the lowest in the EU (Shannon Development, 2004). Companies are not
levied a withholding tax on profits made at Shannon. They also benefit from a network of
double taxation agreements with key countries and tax free income on products

developed and patented in Ireland (Shannon Development, 1998). The Shannon Free
Zone offers extensive cash flow savings to companies, who pay no Value Added Tax
(VAT) on goods and capital equipment imported to the Shannon Free Zone. These
companies pay no custom duties on goods imported from non-EU countries for storage,
handling, and processing. Additionally, there is not a time limit for these goods to be

moved through the Shannon Free Zone. They do not pay duties on goods exported to
non-EU countries (Shannon Development 1999). Shannon Development also offers
grants to companies for site acquisition, building construction, and equipment (capital)
purchases. It offers grants for research and development programs. It offers employment
grants and grants for workforce training and management development. It also offers
rent reduction grants (Shannon Development 1999).
Shannon Development further outlines some of the attraction to the Shannon Free

Zone. Primarily, the companies attracted to the Shannon Free Zone enjoy the benefits of
the zone's low corporate taxation rate of 12.5%. The Shannon Free Zone has direct

proximity to Shannon international airport, making shipping logistics intuitive. Globally,

Shannon's location is well positioned between the United States, Europe, Africa, and the
Middle East. It has an on-site development agency to help new companies set up in the
zone. The Shannon Free Zone is also suited to handle technology companies as the local

work force is well educated through the University of Limerick and the Limerick Institute
of Technology (Shannon Development, 2004).

The Shannon Free Zone has proven to be very successful in drawing foreign
investment. Some of the companies trading out of the Shannon Free Zone include:
Avocent, Cabletron Systems, Element Six, Enterasys, GE, Gymboree, Halifax, Intel,
Lufthansa Technik, Mentor Graphics, Molex, RSA Security, and Thermo King (Shannon
Development, 2004).
One multinational company that has been particularly successful operating out of
Shannon discussed its reasons for choosing the Shannon Free Zone. When Gymboree, a
US based upscale children's clothing retailer, decided to extend its operations into

Europe, it studied locations in the UK and Shannon. One requirement Gymboree had

was to be able to provide inventory cycle times of 48 hours or less (Park, 1998). This

involves receiving an order from a Gymboree store and then delivering that order from
the distribution center by truck and ferry. Shannon is well suited for the distribution
center. Gymboree can receive an order in the mid-afternoon from a store in Manchester
(UK) and deliver that order by store opening the next morning (Park, 1998). Shannon
also provides access to the major cities of Ireland. Shannon is a half hour by air or 2.5
hours by truck from Dublin (Park, 1998). The Shannon Free Zone site has also allowed
Gymboree to pursue expansion and development. When Gymboree opened their

distribution center at Shannon in 1997, they were only utilizing about 17,000 square feet

of a 26,000 square foot building originally developed for manufacturing (Park, 1998). At
the time the article was written, Gymboree was looking to develop a fully automated
50,000-60,000 square foot facility at Shannon (Park, 1998).

In exchange for reduced corporate tax and the Services of Shannon Development,
Gymboree and other companies must meet specific requirements. Two of the most

important are the requirement for the creation of jobs and the generation of passenger or

freight traffic for Shannon Airport. For companies to qualify for the reduced tax rate, they
must create a minimum of 15 new jobs over a three year period (Park, 1998).

Gymboree's agreement with Shannon Development commits them to creating 40 jobs
over a 5 year period (Park, 1998). To aid in creating those jobs, Shannon Development

provided a 10,000 Irish pound grant per job created. The grant was used by Gymboree to
offset rent costs, provide training for new employees, and to purchase capital (Park,
1998). In meeting their requirement to generate air traffic, Gymboree receives

approximately 10 percent of their product through Shannon Airport while the other 90
percent arrives by container ship (Park, 1998).

Another company that has found success at Shannon is Cabletron Systems, a New

Hampshire based manufacturing company of computer networking systems (Park, 1998).
Cabletron opened a 55,000 square foot distribution facility at Shannon in 1997 (Park,
1998). The distribution facility supports its manufacturing facility located in Limerick,
Ireland, which produces approximately 60% of its product worldwide (Park, 1998).

Cabletron Systems has taken full advantage of the proximity of Shannon Airport. It

moves approximately 25% of its products by air through Shannon Airport (Park, 1998).
Any of its products weighing under six kilos and rush shipments are shipped out of

Shannon Airport by DHL (Park, 1998). Shannon Airport is also critical in helping
Cabletron receive products. Cabletron receives 40 to 50 tons of cargo per month from the
United States by air (Park, 1998). Shannon's proximity and ease of customs access

makes receiving goods extremely efficient. Brendon Connors, distribution manager of
Cabletron at the Shannon facility, reports, "From the time a plane lands until a shipment
hits our back door is no more than two hours. That would be days in the U.S" (Park,
1998).

Overall, the Shannon Free Zone has been extremely successful in encouraging

direct foreign investment in the west of Ireland. The arrangement has been profitable for
both Ireland and for the companies participating in the Shannon Free Zone. US
manufacturing companies have realized a 25% rate of return on investment in Ireland, the
highest in Europe (See Appendix F). The Shannon region has benefited through the
creation of new jobs and industries. There are approximately 7,500 people directly
employed by companies participating in the Shannon Free Zone (Shannon Development,

2004). Multinational companies employ 53% of all people employed in manufacturing in
the West of Ireland (Ennis, 2004).

The opening of the TCAA could threaten the future viability of the Shannon Free
Zone. As indicated, the companies engaged in commerce through the Shannon Free
Zone depend on air services through Shannon to move their products throughout Europe
as quickly as possible. This requires frequent, daily, reliable air service. As Shannon

Development states it, "Access is a prerequisite of economic success" (Shannon

Development, 2003, June 6, "Consultation"). Under the TCAA, most air traffic is
expected to relocate to Dublin. Inbound logistics would be particularly affected as goods

would have to be unloaded, clear customs in Dublin, and then reloaded onto trucks to be

shipped to Shannon. All unloading, customs work, and delivery can currently be done in

the same day from the Shannon Airport to companies at the Shannon Free Zone Facility
(Park, 1998). The shipping of goods by truck from Dublin to Shannon alone would add a
minimum 2.5 hours (drive time) to the time goods arrive in Ireland to the time they reach
the Shannon Free Zone. The time would further be increased by what should be longer
unloading and customs times at the busier Dublin airport. To maintain access and

competitiveness, it can be expected that fewer multinational companies will choose to
relocate to the Shannon Free Zone if air access is reduced. The reduction in air services

will have the effect of reversing the "virtuous cycle" (Shannon Development, 2003, June
6, "Consultation"). Fewer companies will choose the Shannon Free Zone because of
reduced air services. In turn, air services will be further reduced by the drop in demand

for them. However, if companies relocate to the Dublin region, they will have greater,
more frequent air access to Europe as Dublin accounts for 84% of all European traffic
from Ireland (Shannon Development, 2003, June 6, "Consultation"). Thus, the demand
for air services in Dublin will increase both direct foreign investment and air services to

Dublin, signaling the shift in demand from the Shannon Region.

Aer Lingus, IALPA, and Aer Rianta

The opening of the TCAA will have significant effects on Aer Lingus, Ireland's
flag carrier. In turn, the way in which Aer Lingus serves Shannon Airport will be
affected. Aer Lingus stands to achieve financial and market share gain under the TCAA
regime. The Irish Air Line Pilots Association (IALPA) also supports the TCAA, as their

membership should benefit from any gain Aer Lingus realizes. Aer Rianta, the Irish State
owned airport management company, opposes the TCAA because of the damaging

effects it will likely have on Shannon Airport and the Shannon Region.
The US-Ireland Bilateral restricts the routes Aer Lingus can operate to the United
States. Currently, Aer Lingus may only operate from Ireland to JFK, BOS, ORD, LAX,

and BWI (IALPA, 2004). Aer Lingus, restricted by the bilateral, has indicated that it
may expand its routes if allowed to do so (Swords Fingal Chamber of Commerce, 2004).
Awareness of the Aer Lingus brand is considered strong even in the United States
(IALPA, 2004). Potential new markets for Aer Lingus include the Pacific Northwest,
Florida, and various other parts of the South (IALPA, 2004). The biggest prize for Aer

Lingus is the potential to break into the US market. The TCAA could allow Aer Lingus
to perform cabotage in the United States domestic market, the largest market for air
services in the world. Pilots at Aer Lingus could also see a financial benefit from the
opening of the TCAA. As the international aviation markets converge, pilot wages in

Ireland should begin to converge with wages of their US counterparts. Pilots of major

EU carriers earn approximately 15% less than pilots of major US airlines (Brattle Group,
2002, p. 104). Pilots of smaller EU carriers earn noticeably less than that of major EU

carriers. Ireland's Aer Lingus is a smaller EU carrier. Pilots at Aer Lingus earn
approximately €67,000-123,000 per year compared to pilots of British Airways who earn
between £54,000-120,000 (€77,000-172,000) (Future Airline Pilot, 2004).

Currently, the Irish Government owns 85% of the Aer Lingus' stock (SIPTU,
2004). The Irish Government has made it clear that it intends to privatize the airline
(SIPTU, 2004). In the TCAA, ownership of airlines would not need to be majority

controlled by national investors. It is therefore possible that Aer Lingus could be sold to

foreign investors (Chambers of Commerce Ireland, 2004, July 6). Competition in Ireland
is an issue. While Aer Lingus operates as an independent carrier currently, it is possible
that it could be purchased by one of its American competitors (BMI, 2004). However,
this could strengthen the airline. In the event that Aer Lingus finds itself in dire financial

conditions, a foreign investor could provide much needed capital to support operations.
European liberalization provides an excellent example of this in the sale of EuroBelgian
Airlines to Virgin Atlantic, who renamed it Virgin Express(CAA, 2004, p. 9). Had Virgin
Atlantic been restricted from purchasing the airline, EuroBelgian would have been

liquidated (CAA, 2004, p. 9). Thus, the airline and the jobs it supported were saved.
Airlines separated by the Atlantic are currently prevented from taking this course of

action because of nationality clauses. While airlines are part of a global industry, such
laws prevent them from acting as a global industry (BMI, 2004).
To further complicate matters for the future of Shannon, Aer Rianta is in the

midst of a major restructuring. Until recently, Aer Rianta managed the airports of
Dublin, Shannon, and Cork in Ireland. On July 14, 2004 legislation passed by Seanad
Eireann began the process of restructuring the company into three independent stateowned authorities (Chambers of Commerce Ireland (CCI), 2004, July 14). The State
Airports Act 2004 establishes the framework for reestablishing Aer Rianta as the Dublin
Airport Authority and separating Shannon and Cork from Aer Rianta as the Shannon

Airport Authority and the Cork Airport Authority respectively (Houses of the Oireachtas,
2004, p. 4).

The designated days Shannon and Cork will be separated are known as Shannon

Appointed Day and Cork Appointed Day (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2004, p. 6). The

legislation stipulates that these days can not occur before the 30th ofApril, 2005 (Houses
of the Oireachtas, 2004, p. 6). Shannon, Cork, and Dublin airports will each be managed
by these independent authorities. The intended purpose of the new structure is to give

each authority the freedom to develop a business model that is adaptive to each airport's
needs. Tadig Kearney, Chairperson of the Air Transport User's council, expresses the

new boards' goal as, "to have more airlines offering more flights to more destinations at

ever more competitive prices, all the time increasing consumer choice. This will promote
tourism, enhance balanced regional development and underpin investment by
international companies in Ireland" (CCI, 2004, July 14). Both the Shannon Airport
Authority and Cork Airport Authority will start fresh with zero debt under the new

legislation, while the Dublin Airport Authority will assume the total debt of Aer Rianta,
which stands at €377 million (Aer Rianta Annual Report (ARAR), 2003, p. 25). The

financial obligations of the new companies are listed under section 9.4.a of the State
Airport Act. The duties of each airport authority are as follows:

(4) (a) It shall be the general duty of each company from its
appointed day—
i) to conduct its affairs so as to ensure that the revenues
of the company are not less than sufficient
taking one year with another to—
(I) meet all charges which are properly chargeable
to its revenue account,

(II) generate a reasonable proportion of the capital
it requires, and
(III) remunerate its capital and pay interest on and
repay its borrowings. (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2004, p.l 1).

Essentially, each airport authority must operate in such a manner that it can pay
its bills, purchase the capital equipment it requires, and repay the debts and interest it
incurs in acquiring capital and conducting business. While this may seem to be a sound

mandate for a new organization, it is unlikely that the Shannon Airport Authority will be
able to meet its financial obligations unless the Irish government actively intervenes. In
its 2003 Annual Report, Aer Rianta reported a healthy profit of €20.2 million. However,
Aer Rianta's Annual Report 2003 does not individually list the profitability of each
airport (SIPTU, 2004). In accounts provided to the Irish government, Shannon Airport
reportedly lost approximately €6 million in 2003 (SIPTU, 2004).
Under the new legislation, the Shannon Airport would lose the cross subsidization
from Dublin Airport that the Aer Rianta management group provides. The Shannon

Airport Authority faces great challenges to meet its financial obligations without this
subsidization. The Shannon Airport Authorty will face even greater financial stress

under the conditions that the TCAA will bring. The SIPTU's members in Shannon
believe that under a two aircraft for one (Dublin/Shannon) bilateral, Shannon Airport will

lose approximately €9 million a year (SIPTU, 2004). However, even a two for one
bilateral scenario provides a generous outlook compared to pure open skies as proposed
in the TCAA. Under the TCAA, the SIPTU's members at Shannon expect the Airport to
lose €16 million or more a year (SIPTU, 2004).

6.0 What Are Possible Solutions for Shannon?

Perhaps if the bilateral status quo is allowed to be temporarily maintained, the
separation of Aer Rianta will give the Shannon Airport Authority a chance to expand its

traffic base, while still receiving one US international arrival for every US international
arrival at Dublin. New traffic and a new management plan might make the Shannon

Airport a profitable venture. Some suggestions to stimulate growth at Shannon:
1. Change Shannon's focus from passenger operations to cargo operations.
2. Entice a low cost carrier to hub operations at Shannon.

3. Improve the ground infrastructure between Shannon and Dublin.
These are suggestions that face difficult implementation and would require the

unwavering commitment of the Irish Government and the support of the EU. These
suggestions may also seem to be idealistic. However, to prepare for the future, it is
important not to forget the lessons of the past. To prepare for Shannon's future, one
should consider the case of Glasgow Prestwick International Airport, the former sole

international gateway to Scotland. As in Ireland, heated debate occurred as to how
Prestwick would be affected if international gateway status was grated to Glasgow

Abbotsinch Airport. In a parliamentary debate, one parliamentarian stated,

"No one denies that Glasgow airport should have more direct flights to Europe

and more European holiday flights, but it should not take away the transatlantic

flights with sustain Prestwick airport. That would be the death knell of Prestwick,
and Glasgow does not have the runway capacity or terminal and ground facilities
to deal with such traffic" (Parliament, 1989).

The argument for Shannon sounds very similar to this one. Yet, Prestwick did
lose its sole gateway status in 1989 and is now a prosperous airport. How did it manage

to overcome the great challenge it faced in losing iis major source of income? It did
initially lose international passenger traffic and charter flights as expected (Parliament,
1993). In 1988 more than 162,000 passengers arrived at Prestwick. By 1992, the number
had declined to fewer than 10,000, of which 7,000 were European Community nationals

(Parliament, 1993). How did Prestwick manage not only to survive, but to turn a profit?

First, the government divested Prestwick from the British Airport Authority. It was sold
to PIK Holdings Ltd, a private enterprise. Second, it followed its own version of the three

suggestions above. Early on BAA recognized the potential to increase freight traffic at
Prestwick, however it did not aggressively pursue growth in freight. PIK Holdings Ltd
aggressively worked for the transformation of the airport into a major cargo hub. PIK
later sold the airport in 2001 to Infratil, a management company from New Zealand. Over
the past 10 years Prestwick's freight business has increased by over 400% (GPIA, 2004).
Infratil's experience has been that air freight grows as multiples of around 3x GDP, with

special express freight growing around 6x GDP (Infratil, 2004). Infratil also speculates
that the growth of the passenger aircraft fleet and its belly-hold capacity has not kept up

with freight demand (Infratil, 2004). Prestwick is the only Scottish airport capable of
providing services to large dedicated freight aircraft such as B747 freightliners.

Prestwick handles freight aircraft 24 hours a day, receiving 23 weekly B747 freight
services, more than any other airport in the UK (Infratil, 2004). It provides these freight
companies with uncongested skies, fast turnaround times, and competitive prices (Infratil,
2004). Prestwick's freight handling facilities are attractive. It built a new 1,500 square
meter freight building to handle cargo and a new maintenance hangar for Polar Air in
1998 (Infratil, 2004).

Infratil has also revitalized passenger traffic at Prestwick. In 2004, Prestwick
handled 1,969,458 passengers, making it the UK's third largest growing regional airport.
A close relationship with low cost carrier Ryanair has helped Prestwick tremendously.
The companies enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship (Infratil, 2004). Prestwick
benefits from the revenue it generates from providing services to Ryanair, and Ryanair
benefits from the highly cost competitive services that Prestwick provides it.
Another step that Prestwick has taken is improving the rail infrastructure between
it and Glasgow. Highly developed ground infrastructure is vital to Prestwick's success as

it makes it easy for passengers to fly in to Prestwick and then link by rail to the major city
of Glasgow. Prestwick is connected to downtown Glasgow by a direct rail link. The link
is integrated with a rail stop built into Prestwick's airport terminal. Passengers can travel
to downtown Glasgow on the rail link services which run every 30 minutes with a travel
time of 40 minutes enroute (Infratil, 2004). Also, passengers who choose Prestwick

benefit from a 50% discount on their rail fare anywhere in Scotland.
Prestwick also competes with the larger Glasgow Abbotsinch by offering the
ability to handle all types of aircraft at all hours of the day. While Glasgow Abbotsinch
handles around 7.2 million passengers per year and 40 airlines, it is restricted in the types
of aircraft it can accept because its longest runway is only 2650 meters compared to
Prestwick's runway of 2987 meters (Infratil, 2004). Glasgow Abbotsinch has nighttime
curfews due to noise issues. Prestwick is able to operate 24 hours a day unrestricted
because it has sparsely populated runway approaches (Infratil, 2004). Prestwick is able

to offer airlines significant pricing advantages and no runway, apron, or terminal
congestion issues that delay aircraft and cost airlines money (Infratil, 2004). The potential

for growth at Prestwick is also greater than that of Glasgow Abbotsinch. Glasgow
Abbotsinch has physical and operational capacity constraints that it may not be able to

significantly overcome in the future. This leaves the excess capacity of Prestwick open
for expansion both in traffic and facilities.

How can Shannon benefit from and apply the lessons that have been learned by

Glasgow Prestwick International Airport? In a sense, the Irish government has already
taken the first step by separating Aer Rianta into three independent government

organizations. This will give Shannon some of the freedom it needs to make tough
decisions, and will determine the success or failure of the Aer Rianta separation for
Shannon. While Shannon does currently cater to freight carriers, it could work to market
Shannon as a cargo hub. Initial research by Shannon Development indicates that
Shannon could be used to move freight anywhere in Europe within 24 to 48 hours (Clare

County Development Board, 2004). This could involve expanding facilities for interested
cargo carriers. It would also most likely involve making pricing of services extremely

competitive compared to prices of cargo handling at Dublin. If cargo carriers could
operate at an economy of scale at Shannon, the idea may be practical. Second, Shannon

may attempt to attract a low cost carrier to hub operations at Shannon rather than Dublin.
The idea of attempting to attract a carrier to hub operations at Shannon has even been
discussed in the Irish Parliament (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2003, May 21). The carrier

would not currently have significant investment in facilities in Ireland, especially at

Dublin Airport. Thus, any growth would be new growth rather than the shifting of

operations. Any flight operations that are to be shifted under the TCAA will go toDublin,
not Shannon. Third, and most importantly, the ground infrastructure connecting Shannon

Airport with Dublin, Cork, and other major industrial centers must be improved (See
appendix C). In appendix B, the rail infrastructure of Ireland is pictured. Currently, there
is no direct rail link between Shannon and Dublin. In the Glasgow Prestwick case, fast

rail access to the major city of Glasgow was a prerequisite for success of the new plan. A

high speed passenger rail link or at least a direct freight rail link with Dublin is necessary,
and would aid in the balanced spatial development of Ireland (See Appendix D). To be

competitive and acceptable to passengers, a high speed rail link should move passengers
from Shannon to Dublin in an hour's time (Murphy, 2004). Without a link directly

connecting Shannon with Dublin, the first two suggestions may be impractical and

ineffective (Murphy, 2004). Once again, "Access is a prerequisite of economic success"
(Shannon Development, 2003, June 6, "Consultation").

7.0 Conclusions

The negotiations between the United States and the European Union over the
details of the TCAA will take time, but will eventually replace the current structure of

bilateral agreements. A free market can and will change the way the aviation industry

operates in the UnitedStates and Europe. Passengers and airlines will both benefit from
reduced costs and improved opportunities that the TCAA will bring.
The TCAA is likely to be adopted, and the bilateral between the US and Ireland to

be nullified. Ireland is not likely to oppose the TCAA strongly because the TCAA will

mean net growth of aviation services in Ireland, increasein tourism, and creation of jobs.

The TCAA is expected to increase international passenger traffic between 9 and 24
percent. Overall, that means more money for Ireland.

Shannon will lose the international traffic that keeps it alive under its current plan

of operations. The Shannon region faces a loss of jobs, tourism, and direct foreign
investment when a full open sky policy is put in place. US airlines will not continue

serving Shannon, because an economy of scale can be realized by concentrating services

at Dublin. The separation of Aer Rianta into separate Airport Authorities will place the
Shannon Airport Authority at a financial disadvantage. The Shannon Airport Authority
will not be able to meet its goal of more flights and increased consumer choice as it will

no longer be able to use access to Dublin as a bargaining chip. Instead, it will struggle to

maintain Shannon as a choice at all. Without a radical change in operating philosophy,
Shannon's future will be compromised. Those charged with the care of Shannon should

take decisive action now to secure its continuing place as the economic flagship of the
west of Ireland.

Appendix A: Winter and Summer Service Schedules at Shannon Airport
Source: Aer Rianta Shannon 2004, January.

Appendix A: Winter and Summer Service Schedules at Shannon Airport
"The tables below show the Winter and Summer schedules at Shannon Airport, and

illustrate the continuing importance of transatlantic service" (Aer Rianta 2004, Jan).

PASSENGER SERVICES- WINTER 03/04

Weekly

Equipment

Route

Airline

Category

Amsterdam

Skynet

Sched.

6

Boeing 737

Atlanta

Delta

Sched

3 direct, 4 via

Boeing 767

Frequency

Dublin

Birmingham
Boston

Brussels

Chicago
Dublin

Frankfurt
London LHR

London STN
Manchester

Flybe
Aer Lingus
Ryanair
Aer Lingus
Aer Lingus
Ryanair
Aer Lingus
Ryanair
British Airways

DH8

Sched

6

Sched.

7

Airbus 330

Sched.

7

Boeing 737

Sched.

6 via Dublin

Airbus 330

Sched.

20

Airbus 330

Sched.

1

Boeing 737

Sched.

21

Airbus 320

Sched.

26

Boeing 737

Sched.

7

Bae 146

Minsk

Belavia

Sched.

2

Moscow

Skynet

Sched.

6 via AMS

Newark

Continental

Sched.

7

Tupolev 154
Boeing 737
Boeing 757

New York

Aer Lingus
Ryanair

Sched.

7

Airbus 330

Sched.

7

Boeing 737

Paris

FREIGHTER SERVICES- WINTER 03/04

Chicago

Cologne

Air France

Sched.

Lufthansa

Sched.

1

Polar Air

Sched.

2 via JFK

Boeing 747
Boeing 747
Boeing 747

DHL

Sched.

6 via Dublin

Airbus 300

1

Cork

TNT

Sched.

6

BAe 146

Dublin

DHL

Sched.

6

Airbus 300

UPS

Sched.

6

Airbus 300

East Midlands

DHL

Sched.

6

Airbus 300

Frankfurt

Lufthansa

Sched.

1

Boeing 747

TNT

Sched.

6

BAe 146

Cargolux

Sched.

1

Boeing 747
Boeing 747
Boeing 747
Boeing 747

Liege
Luxembourg
New York

Polar Air

Sched.

2

Paris

Air France

Sched.

1

San Francisco

Cargolux

Sched.

1

PASSENGER SERVICES- SUMMER 03
Route

Airline

Category

Weekly
Frequency

Equipment

Amsterdam

Skynet

Sched.

6

Boeing 737

Atlanta

Delta

Sched

3 direct, 4 via

MD11

Dublin
Sched.

Manchester

Aer Lingus
Flybe
Aer Lingus
Ryanair
Aer Lingus
Aer Lingus
Skynet
Ryanair
Aer Lingus
Ryanair
British Airways

Baltimore

Birmingham
Boston

Brussels

Chicago
Dublin

Frankfurt

London LHR
London STN

5

Airbus 330

Sched

8

DH8

Sched.

14

Airbus 330

Sched.

7

Boeing 737

Sched.

7 via Dublin

Airbus 330

Sched.

16

Airbus 330

Sched.

2

Sched.

1

Boeing 737
Boeing 737

Sched.

27

Airbus 320

Sched.

28

Boeing 737

Sched.

7

Bae 146

Tupolev 154
Boeing 737
Boeing 767

Minsk

Belavia

Sched.

2

Moscow

Skynet

Sched.

6 via AMS

Newark

Continental

Sched.

7

New York

Aer Lingus
Ryanair

Sched.

9

Airbus 330

Sched.

7

Philadelphia

US Air

Sched.

7

Toronto

Air Canada

Sched.

7

Boeing 737
Boeing 767
Boeing 767

Paris

FREIGHTER SERVICES- SUMMER 03

Polar Air

Sched.

2 via JFK

Boeing 747
Boeing 747
Boeing 747

Cologne

DHL

Sched.

6 via Dublin

Airbus 300

Cork

TNT

Sched.

6

BAe 146

Dublin

DHL

Sched.

6

Airbus 300

UPS

Sched.

6

Airbus 300

East Midlands

DHL

Sched.

6

Airbus 300

Frankfurt

Lufthansa

Sched.

1

Boeing 747

Liege
Luxembourg

TNT

Sched.

6

BAe 146

Cargolux

Sched.

1

New York

Polar Air

Sched.

2

Paris

Air France

Sched.

1

San Francisco

Cargolux

Sched.

1

Boeing 747
Boeing 747
Boeing 747
Boeing 747

Chicago

Air France

Sched.

1

Lufthansa

Sched.

1

Appendix B: Rail Infrastructure of Ireland
Source: Infrastructure Ireland 2004
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Appendix E: Map of the Shannon Free Zone
Source: Shannon Development, 2004
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Sources: Figure A: Shannon Development 1999
Figure B: Shannon Development 2004
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